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In the realm of this computing age, malware is becoming steadily more prevalent. 
With the amount of malware samples taken from the wild increasing, malware analysis is 
becoming increasingly necessary. However, the necessary step of malware analysis is not 
straightforward, and is often made intentionally more difficult by malware authors. 
Dynamic sandboxes, often used to analyze wild malware samples, have been used for 
years as a trusted and necessary component for malware analysis. 
 
We expand on the traditional approach to malware analysis by creating a system 
to provide autonomous, automated assistance for analyzing malware samples. Utilizing 
virtual machine technology, open-source memory forensics software, and custom scripts 













 In this computing age, malware is becoming steadily more prevalent. With the 
amount of malware samples taken from the wild increasing, malware analysis – 
specifically, memory forensics for malware analysis – is becoming increasingly 
necessary. However, malware analysis is not a simple matter, as the malware binaries are 
usually packed and it is not always obvious what the malware is doing to the system it 
has infected. 
 
 Malware analysis in general is made difficult in part by code obfuscation 
methods, which cause the malware binary file to be more difficult to reverse engineer. 
When these malware binaries are packed, meaning that they encrypt important 
components and only decrypt them for use, it presents challenge to the analysis of the 
binary. With over half of malware binaries captured exhibiting packing [1], this is 
obviously a prevalent problem for reverse engineering malware. 
 
 To combat the issue of packing, reverse engineers need to unpack the encrypted 
elements. The methods usually involve using pre-built malware unpackers or custom 
software. Unfortunately, most malware unpackers each only work on specific malware 
encryption strategies [4, 5] – they will fail for novel and unique encryption methods used 
by more inventive authors. To unpack a wider variety of malware binaries, a more 
adaptable decryption tool proposed by Raber allows for unpack a much larger group of 
malware binaries [7]. However, analyzing malware binaries still requires that the 
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malware successfully infect and run on a machine, which provides a new set of 
challenges. 
 
 When malware binaries are run, they must be run in a controlled and secure 
environment. To achieve this end, albeit focusing on dynamic analysis of malware rather 
than memory forensics, virtual machine setups have been proposed [2, 3, 6], for dynamic 
malware analysis and possibly extracting the unpacked version of the binaries from 
memory, after the malware can run and decrypt itself. This method relies on memory 
forensics tools [8] to analyze the changes malware has made to the infected computer.  
 
Automating Memory Forensics Analysis 
 
 Our goal in this thesis is to propose a system to assist in automating a portion of 
the malware analysis, specifically by building KVM sandboxes to infect with malware 
and then dissect with open-source memory forensics tools. We want our system to be 
able to take a malware binary, run the malware binary on a KVM sandbox, run scripts to 
analyze the volatile memory of the infected KVM, and to give the analyst the results from 
those scripts. Ideally, we want the output of our system to tell the analyst concisely tell 




METHODS AND MATERIALS 
System-Setup 
 
 Building on running Virtual Machine sandboxes, we designed a system for 
running multiple automatic malware runs on multiple VMs simultaneously. The host, 
Ubuntu server, utilizes KVMs, a type of Virtual Machine, to run our guest Virtual 
Machines. Our KVM acts as our hypervisor, VIRSH the manager of the KVMs, and 
CUCKOO as our live sandbox environment. The relationship is explained through 
diagram below. 
 






 Our system gives us the ability to run potentially malicious programs inside the 
guests from the host, without risking contamination from the guest: as our guest VMs are 
a different type of operating system and the host’s memory is protected through the 
hypervisor. Furthermore, we use Cuckoo to trigger in real time on alerts and gives further 
capabilities to the system. One of Cuckoo’s such capabilities include Virsh, a KVM 
management tool, which we utilize in a multitude of ways. Firstly, we use Virsh to create 
a fresh install on a KVM, which functions as our clean image. Secondly, use Virsh to 
create copies of this clean image, to infect these KVMs. Finally, Virsh efficiently 
produces memory dumps for our analysis from the infected KVMs.  
 
 
Figure 2: KVM Setup 
 
 The KVMs themselves are allocated approximately 4 GB of RAM and 25 GB of 
memory for the virtual hard disk. For our initial prototype, we opt to use Windows 7 on 
all our KVMs, as this is the version of Windows which works best for our system setup. 
Our tools for memory forensics, Sleuthkit and Volatility, are compatible with Windows 7 







Volatile Memory Analysis Using Volatility. 
 
 In the effort to gather accurate information on what the malware is doing to the 
system post-infection, it is necessary to analyze the volatile memory of the KVM. 
Volatility is one of the only open source projects that provides volatile memory analysis, 
and it is often considered the best at this type of analysis. [8] For these reasons, we highly 
recommend utilizing Volatility with a system like ours – especially as Volatility only 
requires a memory dump and the appropriate commands to return useful information. For 
our volatile memory analysis, we are most interested in the following: created processes, 
terminated processes, created files, command line history, modified security identifiers, 
code injection, and registry keys.  
 
 For seeing the processes of a system, Volatility has several commands that go 
through and enumerate the processes of the memory dump – we use pstree and psxview. 
Malware will often try to hide itself in process enumeration through renaming itself and 
updating the lists for process enumeration within the system, which makes automating 
this segment of the analysis tricky. The methods for retrieving files from the volatile 
memory work in a similar fashion, as Volatility’s command filescan completes the job. 
Likewise, to obtain command line history, Volatility has two commands, cmdscan and 
consoles, to achieve this – the first simply tells us what commands were entered into the 
command line, while the second offers what the input and output of those commands 
were. Thus, with a few simple commands from Volatility, it is easy to extract this 
information with an automated system – saving an analyst time from manually doing so. 
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 However, finding security identifiers and code injection is less concrete, and there 
is always the risk that a code injection method that Volatility does not detect has been 
used. To get security identifiers, DLLs, and kernel objects (such as drivers), we use the 
following Volatility commands: dlllist, getsids, svcscan, driverscan, ssdt, privs, envars, 
modules, and modscan. Because the Windows operating system is bloated, these results 
return a very large amount of data – and most of it is not relevant to the malware.  
 
 Thus, it is necessary to compare the results of the non-infected KVM to the 
memory dump of the infected KVM, where the two memory snapshots have been taken 
within the closest time proximity possible – so that the unnecessary information can be 
more easily filtered from the memory snapshot of the infected machine, as it is similar to 
the snapshot from before it was infected.  
 
 Finally, registry keys can be analyzed with Volatility, and is sometimes necessary 
for memory forensics analysis. However, there is no efficient way simply dump all the 
registry keys – for analyzing a registry key, you must have its memory address and use 
one of Volatility’s commands to extract the data from that memory address. We used a 
recursive algorithm to list all the registry keys in the volatile memory, but this is an 
imperfect and inelegant solution. 
  
 In all, our system for automating memory analysis with Volatility is efficient – 
running in approximately 6 minutes on a memory snapshot less than 4 GB. However, the 
registry key enumeration can takes several hours, and often outputs registry values more 
than once due to its recursive structure.  
 
Network Traffic Analysis Using Cuckoo. 
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 Cuckoo has a multitude of capabilities that make it useful for automated malware 
analysis. For our purposes in analysis, we use Cuckoo to analyze network traffic. In the 
future, we also plan on expanding our system’s capabilities utilizing more of Cuckoo’s 
functionality; Cuckoo has plugins for Volatility, for analyzing volatile memory forensics, 
which we would like to see added to this system’s capabilities. 
 
Disk Memory Analysis with Sleuthkit. 
 
 Sleuthkit is one of the best open source platforms for disk memory analysis; it is 
trusted for analyzing memory by law enforcement. [8] It is capable of efficiently 
analyzing a hard drive for data, but we use it specifically for analyzing the virtual hard 
drive for our KVM. This can be done by virtually mounting the virtual hard drive, then 
using Sleuthkit on the mounted partition.  
 
 Because we have a copy of the machine before it was infected and a copy of the 
machine after it’s infection, we can simplify the disk forensics. When we already know 
the file system of the machine before the malware ran on it, we know we are most 
interested in: the timeline of events happening on the disk, created and deleted files by 
the malware, and registry keys. Sleuthkit has tools for recovering deleted files 
(tsk_recover is the method we chose) and the tool tsk_gettimes for a timeline of events 
happening on the disk. Thus, we can get all the deleted files on the disk, and we can 
obtain a timeline for everything that happened to the disk since the moment our malware 
sample started to run. 
  
 Another component that Sleuthkit can do is extract registry key information – 
however, this is not entirely clear in the documentation how to do this through command 
line commands. The user interface for Sleuthkit, Autopsy, allows an analyst to extract 
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registry key information with ease, but we were unable to repeat this with terminal 
commands on our Linux host system.  
 
 Once we have these results, it’s simply a matter of comparing the clean copy of 
the machine with the infected copy of the machine. The time this will take depends on the 
size of the KVM and the RAM of the host machine, but usually will take less than an 





 For our experiment, we used two samples of Pony Loader malware. Specifically, 
we used two samples with the SHA1 hashes b6ab338d8058e2555a573f46afbd016b and 
6db434088b32a974a557eacd0d5b9b60. These can be found online, through searching for 
their hashes. 
 
 Our system, once we have decided on a malware sample to analyze, uses a 
pipeline as described in Chapter 2. The system can create a new KVM to infect with the 
malware sample – there are a multitude of different methods for this. For our purposes, 
specifically used a Simple Python HTTPS Server to download the samples onto the KVM 
and infect the machine. Cuckoo, monitoring the network traffic of the KVM, will record 
this initial infection, but it is clearly not relevant for the analysis as we know the time and 
reason for the connections. 
 
 Next, our system creates memory snapshots of the KVM after infection in time 
increments of one minute, two minutes, and then three minutes. These memory snapshots 
are then passed to a bash script, which will run the Volatility commands we selected as 
useful in Chapter 2. The system can then compare the results of the volatile memory 
analysis with the known volatile memory of the KVM before the malware infected it. 
 
 The second script that runs deals with the virtual hard disk: first, it converts the 
KVM’s virtual hard disk from a .qcow2 format to a .img format, virtually mounts it, and 
then uses Sleuthkit to perform memory forensics on the virtual hard disk.  
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 At the end of this process, the system outputs the results of the memory and 
volatile memory analysis, as well as the network traffic. This will give the analyst the list 







 From the sample malware we tested the system on, we were able to see some 
success from our system, but we also saw a multitude of its failures. We were 
successfully able to extract network information from Cuckoo, to give a timeline of the 
network traffic, and we successfully extracted volatile memory artifacts utilizing 
Volatility in an efficient manner. While the system succeeded in extracting this 
information, it is not easy for an analyst to parse – the Volatility script alone outputted a 
text file of over 4kB to parse, which is not fit our goal for the system returning concise 
information to assist analysts. 
 
 The Volatility script was able to output useful information for most of the 
components we targeted, finishing in under twenty minutes. However, our script failed to 
terminate quickly when enumerating the registry keys. We manually terminated the 
Volatility script after it continued running for several hours; we found that the recursive 
enumeration caused several registry keys to be outputted more than once, showing us that 
this was an inefficient approach to the problem. We expected that the recursively 
enumerating the registry keys was the most time intensive part of the Volatility script, but 
this shows that this manner of extracting registry key information is not ideal for 
automated memory forensics due to the slow run time and inefficient method for listing 
the registry keys. 
 
 In addition, our Sleuthkit script failed to run on several occasions due to a 
mounting error for the virtual hard disk. Our method for mounting the virtual hard drive, 
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such that the KVM’s memory could be analyzed by Sleuthkit, often failed in mounting 
the hard disk. As the hard disk was not mounted, the tools from Sleuthkit could not run 
and extract the information we wanted from the hard disk. These errors are easy to fix 
with human involvement but are not currently fixed in our automated system. 
  
 Thus, the main problems with the system is its sensitivity to errors and too much 
unnecessary data from the Volatility script. The system is not selective enough to pick 
out what is truly activity from malware, and what is simply expected from the Windows 
operating system itself. We stand by the basis of the system, but not in the finesse of the 
system – thus, we succeeded in creating this system to help assisting analysts to reverse 




 First, we would want the system to become useful to the analyst, and this would 
involve making the system more capable of autonomously handling its errors. In addition, 
we would want the output from the system to be more useful for the analyst; instead of a 
massive amount of text to sort through from the volatile memory analysis, we want the 
system to be able to present the analyst with only relevant information. One possible 
example of this would be to add a list of whitelisted processes, such as schvhost.exe, for 
the system to use to narrow down the list of potentially malicious processes running in 
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